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ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND THE NOTION OF
POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
COLIN CRAWFORD *
Environmental justice scholars have noted that, in the United
States, there is less empirical work documenting disparities in
environmental benefits than there is empirical study documenting
the inequitable distribution and cumulative impact of multiple
environmental burdens. 1 The fact that much less has been done
with respect to environmental benefits is, perhaps, unsurprising.
The distribution of parks, green space provision, and walkable
sidewalks, along with access to coastal and water resources, to cite
just four examples, are generally conceived of more as “land use”
than “environmental” matters. In the United States, land use is
sacrosanct—it is the traditional province of local and state
government. 2 Pollution control laws, by contrast, are understood
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, Payson Center for International
Development, Tulane University School of Law. An early version of this Article
was presented at the “New Perspectives on Land Development: Between
Renewed State Interventionism and Post-Dependency” conference, held at the
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, in August 2008, co-sponsored by
the Faculty of Law at the Universidad de los Andes and the Institute for Global
Law & Policy at Harvard Law School. I am grateful to the participants at that
conference for their comments, as well as for those received at the University of
Pennsylvania’s Journal of International Law Annual Symposium on the topic
“Afro-Descendants and Indigenous Peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Legal Rights and Realities.” Kevin Morris and Brandon Sousa provided
invaluable and speedy research help for which I am grateful.
1 See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 328 (2002) (describing Scorecard, a website
that compiles and publishes data on every U.S. county and allows users to
“calculate, within a given county or state, what the distribution of [four particular
environmental] hazards is across race, income, or other demographic or
socioeconomic characteristics.”).
2 For this reason, presumably, Rechtschaffen urges greater environmental
justice action in the United States at these levels of government. See id. at 327–28
(discussing the comparative success of California’s Proposition 65 over the U.S.
Toxics Release Inventory Program in reducing toxic air emissions, and also
referencing Scorecard’s ability to link users to state regulators and local
environmental organizations). Of the above examples, coastal and water
resources are the items most likely to be subject to federal regulation, creating a
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to be more “environmental” than “land use” questions in the
United States, at least since the 1970s. 3 Thus, U.S. environmental
law and regulatory norms emanate in the first instance from the
federal government, even where their implementation and
enforcement occurs at the state or, less often, at the local level. 4
The fact that most empirical work in the environmental justice area
complicated maze of cross-government regulation. See Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2006) (creating the National Coastal Zone
Management Program as well as the National Estuarine Research Reserve system,
under which both federal and state law impact the use and preservation of
resources); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§
1251–1387 (2006) (authorizing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to
implement and enforce measures aimed at restoring and preserving water
resources, which include mandatory state water quality standards as well as
funding for state and federal programs); Robin Kundis Craig, Regulation of U.S.
Marine Resources: An Overview of the Current Complexity, 19 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 3 (2004) (discussing the large number of federal departments and agencies
involved in living coastal and marine resource management, as opposed to the
regulatory split between federal and state agencies in managing nonliving marine
resources); Roderick E. Walston, California Water Law: Historical Origins to the
Present, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 765 (2008) (providing an overview of the “amalgam of
state and federal laws that establish both local and national goals in the field of
water regulation” in California). On the sometimes crippling consequences of the
insistence that “land use” remain a local concern, see, for example, Richard
Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253,
254 (2002), which notes that sprawl results, in part, from conflicting self-interested
actions by multiple localities in the same region. See also Katharine J. Jackson, The
Need for Regional Management of Growth: Boulder, Colorado, as a Case Study, 37 URB.
LAW. 299 (2005) (discussing the negative effects and costs associated with urban
sprawl that result from local land use control).
3 That decade saw the passage of what remain the core federal laws
regulating pollution. See generally Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2006); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act),
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
6901–92 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75
(2006); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 88–99 (6th ed. 2009) (providing a chronology of federal environmental
regulation and noting the decade of the 1970s has been called the “environmental
decade” because it marked the beginning of most major federal environmental
regulation).
4 This sharing of responsibility for lawmaking and implementation is
famously known as “cooperative federalism” and is typical of the environmental
law field. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources
Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2005) (explaining the concept of cooperative
federalism as well as providing a “taxonomy of cooperative federalism, as
actually practiced in the United States”). See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA,
supra note 1, at 328 (discussing environmental data available at the community
level, as well as the perceived need for community activism targeted towards both
the EPA and state regulators).
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documents environmental burdens rather than benefits is
therefore, to some degree at least, a reflection of the structure of
U.S. environmental and land use law. Early environmental justice
cases used, unsuccessfully, theories such as Equal Protection
challenges under the U.S. Constitution 5 and, later still, theories
such as disparate impact, 6 in both cases borrowing from federal
civil rights law. 7 Thus, one can observe a “federalization” of much
of the environmental justice discourse that, in the U.S. context at

5 The cases include Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 558 (11th Cir. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants, where a neighborhood
association alleged “racial discrimination in the siting and permitting of [a] solid
waste landfill”); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No.
Civ.A. 01-702(FLW), 2006 WL 1097498 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, against a claim that it granted permits to operate a granulated blast
furnace slag grinding facility in violation of Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-1763BH, 2004 WL
2108253 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2004), aff’d, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding in
favor of the City where plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the City failed to stop illegal dumping in violation of the Equal
Protection clause); Boyd v. Browner, 897 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 107 F.3d
922 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the government,
where plaintiffs claimed that the reappraisal of property to account for
contamination during EPA condemnation proceedings was performed in a
racially discriminatory manner); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va.
1991), aff’d without opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding in favor of the
defendants in a claim that intentional racial discrimination led to a landfill’s
placement in a predominantly black neighborhood, where evidence presented
shows that the site was chosen based on its central, yet remote, location); E. Bibb
Twiggs v. Macon Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989),
aff’d 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence was insufficient to
establish that permitting a landfill in a predominantly black neighborhood was
motivated by race discrimination, where the only other landfill was located in a
primarily white neighborhood); Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.
Tex. 1979) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds
that plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood that they would prevail in
their claim: that the decision to grant a waste facility permit was motivated by
racial discrimination), aff’d without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). But see
Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (denying the City’s motion for summary judgment against
plaintiffs’ claims that the City intentionally discriminated against them based on
their race “in providing municipal services related to flood protection, zoning,
protection from industrial nuisances, landfill practices, [and] streets and drainage
. . . .”).
6 See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 34–37 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster
eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing disparate impact litigation under the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Title VI regulations).
7 See sources cited supra notes 5 and 6.
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least, resulted in a lack of attention to the “local” land use issues. 8
Of course, land use questions have implications well beyond the
locale where they are made, just as pollution travels beyond state
and local borders. 9
At the analytical, if not the empirical level, this Article
ultimately seeks to demonstrate that this distinction is a false and
damaging one. In the process, the Article also undertakes to
explore a framework for thinking about environmental benefit
provisions as part of a comprehensive environmental justice
strategy. That is, the argument below proceeds on the assumption
that in addition to empirical work, it is essential to define the
normative advantages of what this Article will call a notion of
“positive environmental justice”—that is, of a right to
environmental goods that can be understood to be at least as
important as the right to be protected from environmental harms,
which has been the central focus of most U.S. environmental justice
activity for the last quarter century. 10
Following this introductory section, the Article is divided into
three parts. The first portion of Part 1 will chart the relatively thin
case made in the U.S. literature for what this Article labels
“positive environmental justice.” The second section in Part 1 then
looks outside the United States and analyzes an important and
relatively recent decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court.
The Colombian decision, which affirmed the constitutional and
other international and domestic law rights of native and AfroColombian peoples in that country to make decisions regarding the
use and exploitation of the nation’s abundant forests, 11 provides a
nuanced and extensive defense of what I characterize as positive
8 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 1, at 327–28 (discussing efforts to
handle environmental problems on both the state and local level, such as
California’s Proposition 65 and the Scorecard system developed by the
environmental group, Environmental Defense).
9 The loss of green space to suburban sprawl is an excellent example of this
fact.
See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (detailing how the growth of
American suburbs has influenced economic, social, and technological
development).
10 See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 6, at xxxiii (explaining environmental
justice as “the idea that minority and low-income individuals, communities, and
populations should not be disproportionately exposed to environmental
hazards . . . .”).
11 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Enero 23, 2008 [Jan. 23,
2008], Sentencia C-030/08 (Colom.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional
.gov.co/relatoria/2008/C-030-08.htm [Hereinafter Sentencia C-030/08].
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environmental justice. 12 As such, it provides a compelling model
for those interested in heeding the call to expand environmental
benefits. 13 Part 2 will then identify and critically evaluate
normative advantages that can be derived from a capacious notion
of environmental justice that seeks to secure benefits as well as
burdens. Part 3 will conclude, finally, with reflections on the
consequences of doing so. Specifically, Part 3 will argue that by
moving towards this more capacious notion of environmental
justice, it also will be possible to begin to erode the artificial
distinction between “environmental” and “land use” decisions that
so effectively impede needed changes in land use, environmental
law, and regulation structures and institutions in the United
States. 14
1.

POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

1.1. U.S. Environmental Justice and Environmental Benefits
Over a decade ago, one scholar predicted that “[t]he next
frontier for both the [environmental justice] movement and the
focus of environmental justice scholarship . . . is land use planning .
. . .” 15 That prediction, however, has not come to pass, despite the
fact that for nearly forty years, U.S. jurisprudence has affirmed the
right of all communities to equal municipal service provision, a
category that surely includes parks and green space. 16 As early as
the 1930s, the prominent landscape architect Frederick Olmstead,
Jr. set forth an ambitious park plan for the East Bay of the San
Francisco metropolitan region, one that stressed equal space access
and provision. 17 Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to argue
12 See id. (finding that the consultation of indigenous peoples is necessary for
any law affecting their territory because of its close ties to their communities and
the need to respect indigenous populations).
13 See RECHTSTAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 1, at 328–29 (arguing for more focus
on correcting imbalances in environmental benefits, not just burdens).
14 See id. at 327–28 (discussing information sources focused solely on negative
environmental impacts).
15 Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land
Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
16 See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 461 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1972) (“[W]e
recognize the right of every citizen regardless of race to equal municipal
services.”); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1965) (“The service
rendered by [parks] is municipal in nature . . . . [A park] is more like a fire
department or police department that traditionally serves the community.”).
17 Paul Stanton Kibel, The People Down the Hill: Parks Equity in San Francisco’s
East Bay, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 354 (2007) (noting that with
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that this vision has taken hold as an organizing principle at the
national level; the provision of green space varies widely by
region. 18
To be sure, at the state and local level, there are some notable
exceptions, particularly in California. In the political sphere, for
example, during his successful 2006 campaign, Los Angeles Mayor
Antonio Villaraigosa announced his “Building Parks for Everyone”
plan, in which he announced his view that Los Angeles “needs
many more large and small parks. Ideally [Los Angeles] should
have small parks and open space areas no more than a mile walk
away for anyone in the city.” 19 Efforts in the Los Angeles area to
transform neglected or blighted areas into parks have occurred at
the local community activist and regulatory levels as well. 20 Other
jurisdictions have detailed land use planning tools that focus on
widespread provision of green space. For example, in 2005,
Georgia passed the Georgia Land Conservation Act that
established a statewide conservation program designed to preserve
the state’s land resources by emphasizing partnerships between all
The Land
levels of government and the private sector. 21
Conservation Act did not, however, emphasize social equity in the
allocation of conservation land. 22
widespread ownership of cars it became “possible for a large portion of the
population to spend many leisure hours in the country . . . .”).
18 See, e.g., TRUST FOR PUB. LAND, TOTAL PARKLAND AS PERCENT OF CITY LAND
AREA (2008) (comparing park acres as a percent of land area for several U.S. cities
throughout the country).
19 Kibel, supra note 17, at 339.
20 See Heather Barnett, The Chinatown Cornfields: Including Environmental
Benefits in Environmental Justice Struggles, 8 CRITICAL PLAN. 50, 51 (2001)
(recounting development efforts and demands for environmental justice in Los
Angeles’ Chinatown); Robert García & Aubrey White, Warren County’s Legacy for
Healthy Parks, Schools And Communities: From the Cornfield to El Congreso and
Beyond, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 127, 127 (2007) (tracing the development of
environmental justice movements and provisions for green space following the
Chinatown Cornfield efforts); Robert García et al., Healthy Children, Healthy
Communities: Schools, Parks, Recreation, and Sustainable Regional Planning, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267, 1267 (2004) (linking lack of adequate open space in urban
areas to rising childhood obesity rates); Paul Stanton Kibel, Los Angeles’ Cornfield:
An Old Blueprint for New Greenspace, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 275, 277 (2004) (detailing
how the vacant “Cornfield” of Los Angeles will be made into a public park).
21 See Press Release, State of Georgia Office of the Governor, Landmark
Georgia Land Conservation Act Becomes Law (Apr. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.georgia.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,78006749_79688147_93023024,0
0.html (describing $100 million loan fund with state, federal and private funds).
22 See GA. CODE ANN. § 12–6A–1 (2010) (making no mention of the allocation
of conservation land).
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The academic literature on equitable provision of green space
and “positive” environmental benefits is not much more extensive
than the literature already cited above. 23 Of the few useful studies
that exist, most come from practitioners and activists rather than
scholars. 24 Government-sponsored studies are equally few and far
between. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency contracted
the National Academy of Public Administration to prepare a report
in July 2003 that examined the land use-environmental justice
nexus. 25 In sum, while sometimes useful, these scattered studies,
commentaries, and analyses do not amount to a focused and
coherent defense of what this Article labels the “positive concept of
environmental justice.” 26 For this reason, Decision C-080 of the
Colombian Constitutional Court, which struck down the thenextant forestry law, merits special attention.
1.2. The Colombian Forestry Law Case
Of Colombia’s legal industries, forestry ranks among the most
important. 27
Logically enough, in light of the industry’s
23 See, e.g., Peter Harnik & Jeff Simms, Parks: How Far Is Too Far, PLANNING,
Dec. 2004, at 8–9 (discussing the importance of proximity for park access and the
lack of major U.S. cities that take it into account); Deborah Keeth, Book Note,
Wilderness as a Matter of Environmental Justice, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 209, 209 (2004)
(reviewing JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND
APPLICATIONS (Kathryn M. Mutz et al., eds., 2002)); Patricia Salkin, Intersection
Between Environmental Justice and Land Use Planning, 56 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., 5–7
(2006) (surveying land use tools that can be put to the service of environmental
and land use justice).
24 See García et al., supra note 20, at 1267 (linking lack of adequate open space
in urban areas to rising childhood obesity rates); Kibel, supra note 17, at 335
(inquiring whether the differential access to East Bay Parks might be due to
environmental racism); BAY AREA OPEN SPACE COUNCIL, PARKS PEOPLE AND
CHANGE: ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR PARKS, RECREATION AND OPEN
SPACE CONSERVATION IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 43 (2004) (reporting
observations collected from various public agencies and land conservation
organizations); CHONA SISTER ET AL., ACCESS TO PARKS AND PARK FACILITIES IN THE
GREEN VISIONS PLAN REGION 3 (2008), available at http://www.greenvisionsplan
.net/html/documents/17_access_parks_and_park_facilities_in_the_green_visions
_plan_region_081508.pdf (detailing “access to and equity in the distribution of
park and open space resources” in parts of southern California).
25 See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ADDRESSING COMMUNITY
CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND USE PLANNING AND
ZONING (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources
/reports/annual-project-reports/napa-land-use-zoning-63003.pdf.
26 See Keeth, supra note 23, at 214–17 (detailing how environmental justice is
integral to effective administration of public policies and programs).
27 The CIA World Factbook reports that agricultural occupations account for
18% of the labor force and, of agricultural products, forestry products are the 11th
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importance and value to the nation, in 2006 the country enacted a
general forestry law: “[t]he present law intends to establish the
National Forest Plan . . . . To this end, the law establishes the
necessary organization by the State to regulate activities related to
natural forests and forest plantations.” 28 These include not only
“the conservation and sustainable management of [the country’s]
natural forests and forest plantations in soils dedicated to forest
use,” 29 but also the following provision, one that appears on its
face to commit the country to what can only be understood as a
broad-based commitment to environmental justice regarding forest
use:
[A]ll public institutions of the country that participate in
development of the forest sector, the norms, strategies and
national policies of the said Plan, with the aim to guarantee
the organic character [literally, the “organicity”] and
coherence required as an essential condition to provide for
sustainable investment and growth in the forest sector,
including that by economic agents and forestry actors in
general, [by means of] a clear, universal and legally secure
framework. Said provision operates without prejudice to
the autonomy and powers accorded by law to the
environmental and territorial authorities, as well as
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.” 30

most important. U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2011),
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos
/co.html (follow “Economy: Columbia”).
28 Ley 1021 de 2006, abril 24, 2006 Diario Oficial [D.O.] 46.249, art. 1 (Colom.),
available
at
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/2006
/ley_1021_2006.html (“La presente ley tiene por objeto establecer el Régimen
Forestal Nacional . . . . A tal efecto, la ley establece la organización administrativa
necesaria del Estado y regula las actividades relacionadas con los bosques
naturales y las plantaciones forestales.”).
29 Id. art. 2, § 1 (“[L]a conservación y el manejo sostenible de sus bosques
naturales y el establecimiento de plantaciones forestales en suelos con vocación
forestal . . . .”).
30 Id. art. 2, § 2.
[T]odas las instituciones públicas del país que participen en el desarrollo
del sector forestal, a las normas, estrategias y políticas nacionales de
dicho Régimen, en la perspectiva de garantizar la organicidad y la
coherencia requeridas como condición esencial para propiciar la
inversión sostenida y creciente en el sector forestal, brindando a los
agentes económicos y actores forestales en general, un marco claro y
universal de seguridad jurídica. Dicha cláusula opera sin perjuicio de las
autonomías y potestades acordadas por la ley a las autoridades
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Moreover, the Forestry Law created the National Forest
Council, which included not only representatives of government,
industry, and universities, but also representatives of indigenous
groups and Afro-Colombian communities. 31 However, these steps
were not enough to rescue the Forestry Law from a successful
constitutional claim challenging its failure to substantively serve
the interests of Colombian racial and ethnic minority groups. 32
1.2.1.

The Legal Challenge

In August of 2006, the Public Interest Law Group at the
University of the Andes in Bogotá (“G-DIP”) 33 formed an alliance
with an inter-American environmental group to challenge the
General Forestry Law as unconstitutional. 34 In the first semester of
2007, G-DIP filed a complaint in Colombia’s Constitutional Court 35
challenging the constitutionality of the Forestry Law. 36 For those
ambientales y territoriales, así como a las comunidades indígenas y
afrocolombianas.
Id.

31 Id. tit. I, ch. 1, art. 7 (listing in detail the diverse membership of the
National Forest Council broken down by representation, which notably includes
members of indigenous groups as part of the body).
32 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11 (declaring the Forestry Law to be
unconstitutional based on the legislature’s failure to consult indigenous
communities and people of African descent during the process of drafting and
enacting the law).
33 “G-DIP” is a Spanish acronym for “Grupo de Derecho de Interés Público.”
See Grupo de Derecho de Interés Público, http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2011) (emphasizing the groups goals to connect the university with
society, increase focus on legal education in Colombia, and solve structural
problems of society using the law, particularly those problems affecting
vulnerable communities).
34 The group was the Asociación Interamericana para la Defensa del
Ambiente.
See G-DIP—Lineas de Trabajo, http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co
/interno.php?Id=6&Menu=10&lang=es (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (detailing how
the partnership attacked the General Forestry Law on the grounds that it did not
promote sustainable development and was enacted without the consultation of
indigenous peoples).
35 See generally Miguel Schor, An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional
Courts: The Cases of Mexico and Colombia, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 186–89
(2009) (discussing the formation and functionality of the Colombian
Constitutional Court and concluding that its method of judicial appointment,
jurisdiction over matters involving the violation of ordinary citizens’ fundamental
rights, and practical perspective on how those rights should be understood have
helped it develop into a “powerful guardian of constitutional rights”).
36 Demanda de inconstitucionalidad contra la Ley 1021 de 2006 o Ley General
Forestal [hereinafter Complaint], available at http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co
/leyforestal.html. Although four lawyers associated with G-DIP were the
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interested in environmental protection and sustainable
environmental management practices, as well as for those
committed to the goals of the environmental justice movement, the
complaint (and the decision to which it led) is a document of
special interest because of its conceptual breadth. 37 That is,
perhaps reflecting the complaint’s genesis in a clinic devoted to
constitutional matters, it does not make its case in mere reliance
upon environmental statutes and regulations. On the contrary, the
complaint looks to a broad range of Colombian legal rights—some
with origin in Colombian ratification of international
agreements 38—based on equality principles.
The central claim of the complaint rests upon the premise that
the forestry law failed “for not having realized a prior consult [a
form of public hearing] with either indigenous communities or
Afro-descendent communities during the process of drafting the
legislative initiative that let to the passage of Law 1021 of 2006.” 39
The specific procedural error alleged by the complaint was a
failure to recognize Colombian international treaty obligations,
specifically International Labour Organization (“ILO”) Convention

principal plaintiffs, they were supported in their action by other organizations like
the Friends of the Earth Colombia and Asociación Centro Nacional Salud,
Ambiente y Trabajo (CENSAT Agua Viva). See, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INT’L,
SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 2008 (2009), available at http://www.foei.org/en
/resources/publications/annual-report/2008/what-we-achieved-in-2008
/member-groups (follow “Latin America and the Caribbean” hyperlink; then
follow “Colombia: Court Overturns Controversial Forestry Law” hyperlink)
(describing Friends of the Earth Colombia’s and CENSAT Agua Viva’s opposition
to the General Forestry Law and the Colombian Constitutional Court’s
subsequent finding that the law was unconstitutional). Some of the points
advanced here with respect to the complaint and subsequent decision were first
explored in Colin Crawford, Derechos culturales y justicia ambiental: lecciones del
modelo colombiano, in JUSTICIA COLECTIVA, MEDIO AMBIENTE Y DEMOCRACIA
PARTICIPATIVA 27, 42–61 (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed., 2010) [Hereinafter
JUSTICIA COLECTIVA].
37 See generally Complaint, supra note 36 (raising arguments based in
international treaty obligations, constitutional protection of pluralism,
constitutional minority rights protections, in addition to the Forestry Law’s own
provisions).
38 Id. at 21–27 (discussing the constitutional provisions violated by the
Forestry Law and focusing especially on Article 6 of the ILO Convention 169
which requires legislatures to consult with indigenous peoples when formulating
laws which will affect them—this provision has been incorporated into
Colombia’s constitution).
39 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.], art. 100, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html.
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169 on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. 40 ILO
Convention 169 creates the duty to “consult the peoples concerned,
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their
representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given
to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them
directly.” 41 This step is extraordinary compared to U.S. practice; to
put it mildly, reliance upon treaty obligations as a means to secure
domestic rights is a controversial practice in the United States, 42 to
say nothing of the use of foreign law, which continues to prove
deeply contentious. 43 But in Colombia, according to the complaint,
a violation of ILO Convention 169 was tantamount to a
constitutional violation since the treaty duty was part of the
“constitutional bloc,” 44 including ILO Convention 169 duties to
observe this and other treaty commitments, like rights of selfdetermination (Article 9) and, more generally, human rights
obligations (Article 93). 45 However, by itself, this argument might
40 Int’l Labour Org., Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, 28 I.L.M. (1989), available at
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm
(framing the international standards for recognizing the rights of Indigenous and
Tribal people).
41 Id. art. 6(1)(a).
42 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 331 (2006)
(No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875, at *30 (“The long-established presumption is that
treaties and other international agreements do not create judicially enforceable
rights.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
11, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566), 2006
WL 271823, at *11 [hereinafter Gov’t Sanchez-Llamas Brief] (arguing that
international agreements are generally presumed not to confer judicially
enforceable individual rights); David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually
Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and SanchezLlamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20 (2007) (noting that in both the SanchezLlamas and Hamdan cases, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided a direct answer to this
issue, and providing a preliminary framework for thinking about introducing a
doctrinal innovation that would address the enforcement of rights created by
treaty).
43 Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 28,
2008, at 50–57, 66, 70 (discussing the ongoing debate within the Supreme Court as
to how international law should interact with the U.S. system, and pointing out
the impact Supreme Court decisions have on the country’s international policies).
44 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 36, at 36 (stating that under Colombian law,
Article 6 of ILO Convention 169 expanded the rights granted in Article 330 of the
Colombian Constitution, making violation of the treaty provisions a violation of
constitutional law).
45
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [CONSTITUTION], arts. 9, 93,
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html
(recognizing the right to self determination as one of the three tenets of state
foreign relations, and stating that constitutional rights are construed according to
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not have held. The protections offered by Articles 9 and 93 are
only general. 46 The “human rights” to which Article 93 refers, for
example, are not specified. 47 Moreover, the two articles do not
relate to either the particular context of the Colombian forestry law
or to the interests of traditional communities, whether indigenous
or Afro-Colombian. 48 The complaint’s next argument cleverly
links the treaty commitments to existing Colombian minority
rights, specifically to more detailed rights articulated in the
Constitution itself.
The constitutional rights to which the complaint referred were
of two types. The first type protects rights enjoyed by all members
of Colombian society. Articles 1, 2, and 3 articulate the aspirational
character of the Colombian democracy and in particular provide
that it is to be both pluralistic and participatory. 49 The second type,
by contrast, provides specific protection of minority rights. Article
7 refers to a particular feature of Colombian pluralism, namely a
commitment to “ethnic and cultural pluralism.” 50 Article 13
commits to protect groups that suffer from discrimination or have
otherwise been marginalized in Colombian society, 51 while Article
330 entitles indigenous people to the right to self-determination in
the exploitation of natural resources within their lands. 52
A less thoughtful argument might have only focused on Article
330 as a means to invalidate the Colombian forestry law. Article
330 is the most concrete of all the cited provisions, and, at least on
its face, would appear to demand the forestry law’s reformulation
to the extent that it implicated the use of forests within indigenous
lands. But the complaint cleverly juxtaposed its claims, suggesting
that the goal of a pluralistic society that respects minority rights

human rights treaties to which Colombia is a party); see also Complaint, supra note
36, at 28 (stating that Convention 169 was Colombian law regardless of whether
there were statutory provisions implementing it).
46 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, supra note 45, art. 93 (referring
generally to “treaties and conventions ratified by the Congress”).
47 See id. art. 93 (referring generally to “the human rights treaties ratified by
Columbia”).
48 Id.
49 See id. arts. 1–3 (setting forth constitutional principles of territorial
sovereignty within the state, democracy, equal protection of law, and personal
liberty).
50 Id. art. 7.
51 Id. art. 13.
52 See id. art. 330 (outlining the administrative functions and principles of
government to be used by political councils governing indigenous territories).
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should be measured not only by internal legal obligations to equal
protection but also by international ones. 53
These equal protection commitments are then paired with
specific minority entitlements, namely the self-determination of
Thus, the complaint
resource use by indigenous people. 54
implicitly made the case—by virtue of its juxtaposition and
accumulation of constitutional protections—that the Colombian
Constitution centrally and fundamentally commits the nation to
minority protection, not just in isolated articles but also throughout
its text. Moreover, the complaint urged the Court to apply the
widest possible definition of environmental justice, meaning one
that allows for special minority protections while also protecting
the environmental rights of all citizens. 55 All Colombians need be
considered, the complaint suggested, when national natural
resources were at stake: “[t]he Court should recognize as
beneficiaries of the prior hearing not only those in indigenous
lands but also Afro-descendents. In equal manner, the object of the
duty was expanded, such that it is not limited . . . but also to
extend to all of those susceptible to being directlty affected [by the
decisions].” 56
1.2.2.

The Constitutional Court Decision

Article 79 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 guarantees
that “all people have the right to a healthy environment. The law
will guarantee the participation of communities in decisions that

53 See Complaint, supra note 36, at 32 (noting that national and international
measures are relevant in examining the obligations that the state has to
indigenous people).
54 See id. at 22–23 (summarizing the relevant provisions of the constitution
that point to the right of indigenous people to determine how resources within
their territories are used).
55 See id. at 29 (urging the constitutional court to make it mandatory for
indigenous people to be involved in the allocation of their natural resources and
to do so according to the customs of each ethnic group).
56 JUSTICIA COLECTIVA, supra note 36, at 221.

Se reconocieron como beneficiarios del derecho a la consulta previa [de
medidas legislativas] no sólo a los territorios indígenas sino también a
los afrodescendientes. En igual sentido, el objeto de la obligación de
realizar consulta fue ampliado, toda vez que ya no se limita a las
decisiones sobre explotación de recursos naturales, sino que se extiende a
todas aquellas susceptibles de afectarlos directamente.
Id. This quotation comes from the part of the decision in which the Court
reiterated the parties’ arguments in the civil law fashion.
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may affect them.” 57 Yet interestingly, the Constitutional Court did
not rely upon Article 79 for its decision that the national forestry
law could not stand. Instead, the Court’s opinion endorses
environmental justice principles while not basing the claim upon a
legal right or obligation specifically identified in an environmental
or natural resource law or regulation. 58 That is, it can be said to
endorse a view of positive environmental justice, one that argues
for equality in access to and control over a clean environment as
among those things that constitute a just society.
In the press release announcing the decision, the Court
declared that in its decision “the Court reiterates the line of
jurisprudence traced in material that recognizes ethnic and cultural
diversity as a constitutional principle and foundation of Colombian
nationality.” 59 As the Court’s decision further clarified, this
reasoning is constitutionally required under constitutional Articles
1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 93 and 330. 60 As the press release and the decision
itself went on to explain, this conclusion was compelled because
Colombia must be understood “as a democratic, participatory and
pluralistic State.” 61
Given the context, this must be judged as an environmental
justice victory of the highest order, linking, as it does, equality
principles and environmental management decisions. In fact,
Colombia’s population is, in absolute numbers, not especially
diverse. Although census and other survey classifications of race
and ethnicity are problematic because they typically rely upon self57 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, supra note 45, art. 79 (providing
that the law guarantees the participation of the communities “[t]odas las personas
tienen derecho a gozar de un ambiente sano. La ley garantizará la participación
de la comunidad en las decisiones que puedan afectarlo.”).
58 See generally Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11 (discussing the procedural
defects and omissions in the court’s opinion that affect the materiality of the legal
right of indigenous communities to consultation in the formation of forestry law).
59 See
Press Release, Republica de Colombia Corte Constitutional,
Comunicado de Prensa No. 1 de 23 de enero de 2008 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at
http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co/leyforestal.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011)
(highlighting the court’s acknowledgement that the constitution requires that
special consideration be given to ethnic and cultural diversity in jurisprudence—
“La Corte reiteró la línea jurisprudencial trazada en materia de reconocimiento de
la diversidad étnica y cultural como principio constitucional y fundamento de la
nacionalidad colombiana.”).
60 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11 (premising the court’s line of
reasoning on the text of the constitution).
61 See Press Release, supra note 59 (explaining that there is a constitutional
duty imposed on the judiciary by article 1 that compels the result); See, e.g.,
JUSTICIA COLECTIVA, supra note 36, at 276–77.
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reporting and so responses often reflect cultural and social
stereotypes, it is at least true to say that, comparatively speaking,
the ethnic and racial populations constitute a relatively small
percentage of the Colombian population. Indigenous people
constitute but 1.75% of the national population, while the AfroColombian population represents approximately 12% of the
By contrast, elsewhere in the continent the
population. 62
indigenous population is much more significant: 55% in Bolivia, 63
25% in Ecuador, 64 and 45% in Peru. 65 Brazil, like Colombia a
country with extensive forests traditionally the home of indigenous
people and also a country whose history was marked by the
African slave trade, has an official Afro-Brazilian population of
44.7%. 66 The United States, like Brazil a nation of near-continental
dimensions once dominated by indigenous people, and also a
country shaped by the African slave trade, reports official statistics
comparable to Colombia’s composition. The United States has an
official indigenous population of but 1.15%; African-Americans
constitute 12.85% of the official national total. 67 Nevertheless, the
Columbian Court accepted the claim advanced in G-DIP’s
complaint that the actual population percentage had
disproportionate influence over management of the resource. 68
The Court recognized that the lands of indigenous peoples and
Afro-descendents constituted fully 32.2% of the national territory
overall—not an inconsequential fraction. 69 Moreover, in defined
DANIEL BONILLA MALDONADO, LA CONSTITUCIÓN MULTICULTURAL 26 (2006).
See U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, Field Listing—Ethnic Groups, 2008
WORLD FACTBOOK, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/fields/2075.html (reporting that of the indigenous population in
Bolivia, 30% are Quechua, 25% are Aymara, and another 25% are classified as
mestizo, meaning of mixed white and Amerindian ancestry).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA, 2000 BRAZIL CENSUS
available
at
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/populacao/co
r_raca_Censo2000.pdf (providing population statistics from the 2000 census).
67 See U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, supra note 63 (providing the actual
count of ethnic populations in the United States from 2000-2007); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN
2005 (2005) (detailing the Hispanic component of the United States’ ethnic
population).
68 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, ¶ 5.1 (detailing the court’s reasoning
and analysis on the right of participation of indigenous communities).
69 Id.; cf. Complaint, supra note 36, at 30. (quantifying the fraction of land
inhabited by Afro-descendents).
62
63
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regions of Colombia, the percentage was much higher, further
strengthening the case. 70
In other words, the Constitutional Court’s decision represents a
commitment to a diverse and pluralistic society where one might
have thought that, by the absolute numbers, it least mattered.
Thus, the decision affirms a principle defending the rights of a
minority group, no matter how small, as a reflection of a nation’s
deepest values. It further articulates a commitment to diversity
because of the importance of preserving the traditions, practices,
and cultures that help define a nation. In this, too, the decision
ought to be read as an important articulation of environmental
justice principles, since affirmation of the principle of respect for
minority rights is framed in terms of a question of access to natural
resources with implications for environmental management and
protection.
In fact, the Court endorsed the arguments of the G-DIP and
affiliated plaintiffs in nearly every respect. It thus held that the
forestry law “should have been submitted to a consult process with
indigenous and tribal communities prior to its passage.” 71
Moreover, as the Court clarified, “to establish in what sense the
70 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, ¶ 5.1 (detailing the fractions of
national territory controlled by ethnic populations).

Por un lado, el carácter general e integral de la ley hace que resulte
imposible excluir de su ámbito de aplicación a las comunidades
indígenas y tribales, a las cuales, según documentos oficiales, se las ha
hecho entrega formal de un total de 36,336.807 hectáreas de tierras, lo
que representa el 32.2% del área total nacional, si se tiene en cuenta,
además, que, de acuerdo con el informe de ponencia para segundo de
debate del Proyecto de Ley Forestal en la plenaria del Senado de la
República, [d]el área cubierta en bosque natural; en el Pacífico y la
Amazonia, cerca del 41.6% pertenece a comunidades indígenas y
afrocolombianas. De hecho el 72% de los territorios de los resguardos
indígenas, es decir 22.5 millones de hectáreas, coinciden con áreas
boscosas; por su parte, del 69.4% de las tierras adjudicadas a
comunidades afrocolombianas, cerca de 2.6 millones de hectáreas cubren
áreas boscosas. Estas comunidades dependen casi en su totalidad de los
recursos que le proveen los bisques.
Id. (footnote omitted).
71 Id., pt. VI, ¶ 5.1.
Tal como se ha señalado, en este caso el problema de constitucionalidad
que le ha sido planteado a la Corte conduce a establecer, en primer lugar,
si la Ley 1021 de 2006, o Ley General Forestal, debía haber sido sometida
a un proceso de consulta con las comunidades indígenas y tribales
previamente a su expedición.
Id.
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forestry law contained an obligation to consult, it is necessary to
attend to the controversy that occurred from the moment that the
initiative was presented to Congress,” because those changes
implicated the very tribal and indigenous interests affected by the
proposal. 72 This is further striking in that the Court thus makes
clear that a prior consult in environmental decisions (or, for that
matter, other administrative decisions where a consult is required)
is not a pro forma activity to be conducted at the end of a matter,
but one based upon a robust notion of inclusion, in which
stakeholder participation is valued because it is understood that
involvement from the beginning of a process is different than a
formal nod to airing of complaints and concerns once a project is
nearly ready for signature. Furthermore, the Court endorsed the
suggestion that the consult was compelled, at least in part, by the
obligations of ILO Convention 169. 73
The complaint advanced the notion, accepted by the Court, that
the appropriate process for the prior consult would be distinctive
in three crucial respects. First, it would be understood as both
necessary and obligatory at the legislative level. 74 That is, a prior
consult is required for any legislation affecting ethnic and minority
communities. Decision C-030 confirms this requirement for a
legislative consult is terribly important. It reflects the Court’s
understanding that a pluralistic democracy requires public
participation at the earliest possible stage, rather than, for example,
immediately prior to the issuance of a regulatory norm by an
executive branch agency, as is typically the case, for example, in
the United States. 75

72

Id. In full, the explanation reads:

[P]ara establecer si en relación con la ley forestal existía un deber de
consulta, es preciso atender a la controversia que se suscitó desde el
momento mismo en el que se presentó la iniciativa a la consideración del
Congreso, porque muchas de las modificaciones que se le introdujeron a
lo largo del debate serían indicativo de que los temas sobre los que
versaba el proyecto comprometían aspectos que afectaban directamente
a las entidades tribales que son titulares del derecho de consulta.
Id.
73 Id. (“El debate sobre tales materias se adelantó, sin embargo, sin que se
hubiesen cumplido los presupuestos para la consulta a los pueblos indígenas y
tribales en los términos del Convenio 169 de la OIT.”).
74 See Complaint, supra note 36, at 36–40 (asserting that the legislature should
be required to consult with affected groups during the entire process of drafting
relevant bills).
75 THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 187–90.
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Second, and equally radical in potential scope, the complaint
urged the Court to acknowledge that this consult would be
required not just for direct effects on indigenous and AfroOn the contrary, it would, the
Colombian communities. 76
petitioners argued, apply to any exploitation of national forests. 77
Third, the Court helped articulate a notion of positive
environmental justice when it supported the early, broad, and deep
inclusion of affected communities because of the environmental
imperative, noting that Colombian forests contained nearly 10% of
global biodiversity. 78
2.

THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR A BROAD, PLURALISTIC VISION OF
POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

It merits asking, then, what makes Decision C-080 of the
Colombian Constitutional Court useful beyond the confines of its
particular case. What makes the case special for one wishing to
make the normative case for positive environmental justice? First,
the fact that the decision locates the basis for its argument in the
national constitution, a foundational document, is a fact that
cannot be undervalued. As the frustrated story of U.S. attempts to
secure environmental justice claims in terms of the Equal
Protection Clause demonstrate, 79 this is not necessarily an easy
matter. That is, despite the common criticism of post-colonial
constitutions as “overflowing with promise”—and promises that
cannot be kept 80—Decision C-080 affirms the value of giving the
76 See Complaint, supra note 36, at 30–33 (arguing that the close ties between
the identities of indigenous groups and their territories requires their consultation
in all matters affecting the territory, even if the effects are indirect ones).
77 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, pt. III.

[S]e reconocieron como beneficiarios del derecho a la consulta previa [de
medidas legislativas] no solo a los territorios indígenas sino también a
los afrodescendientes. En igual sentido, el objeto de la obligación de
realizar consulta fue ampliado, toda vez que ya no se limita a las
decisiones sobre explotación de recursos naturales, sino que se extiende a
todas aquéllas susceptibles de afectarlos directamente.
Id.

78 Id. pt. VI, ¶ 5.1 (discussing the biodiversity found in the region); see also
Complaint, supra note 36, at 30 (outlining the composition of the Colombian
forests). In fact, more recent U.N. estimates put the figure at 14%.
79 See supra note 5 (providing cases in which environmental justice claims
were brought unsuccessfully under the Equal Protection Clause).
80 See DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE
POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000) (reporting mixed conclusions on
the successful implementation of the Bolivian and Colombian constitutions). Van
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environment constitutional protection that can be reinforced with
subsequent articulation by other governmental branches.
Second, Decision C-080 can be considered a triumph of legal
pluralism in light of the manner in which it celebrates Colombia as
a diverse state. For example, at the beginning of the opinion, the
Court demonstrated its sympathy for arguments framed by some
of the petitioners and their supporters in the case. 81 The Court thus
stated its understanding that the forestry law, because of its noninclusive drafting, resulted in the following situation: “the
regulation of native forests . . . with a criterion that gave primacy to
extraction over ecology, affect[ing] in a clear and direct way the
said [indigenous and Afro-descendent] communities.” 82 This
situation, as the previous section makes clear, was unacceptable.
What is key here is the recognition that traditional communities
Cott notes numerous paradoxes, for example, while “constitution-makers [in both
countries] believed that their constitutional reforms would legitimate democratic
institutions and that this would lead to increased voter registration and reduced
abstention. . . . In Colombia, voter abstention actually increased after 1991[,]” as it
did in Bolivia. At the same time, “in both countries the indigenous population
increased its levels of registration and voting.” Id. at 224. Van Cott further
reports complaints from some elders of indigenous groups in Colombia that “new
political openings have resulted in conflict between older [political] authorities
and younger political officeholders, resulting in community fragmentation and a
decline in the value of traditional authority.” Id. at 240. Van Cott also notes that
“[o]bservers point out a basic contradiction between the emphasis of the 1991
Constitution on improving the quality of democracy and the neoliberal economic
reform that accompanied the charter’s implementation . . . . The extreme
inequality in the distribution of resources impedes the disempowered majority
from exercising their new rights to participation.” Id. at 248; see also, Laurie
Goering, Venezuela’s Draft Constitution is Overflowing With Promise, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
14, 1999, at 6 (discussing the lengthy Venezuelan constitution and presenting
some of its major criticisms); Monte Reel, South America’s Constitutional Battles: As
Three Leaders Attempt to Reshape Power, One Question is Central: Who Would Benefit?,
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2008, at A12 (considering efforts to rewrite the constitutions
of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to reflect “21st-century socialism” and the
resulting political backlash).
81 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, pt. VI, ¶ 2 (acknowledging the
support groups that contributed to the claim that the issuance of law 1021 of 2006
omitted the constitutional requirement of consultation with indigenous and Afrodescendant communities).
82 See id.
[C]onsulta que era imperativa a la luz de nuestro ordenamiento
constitucional, debido a que la ley general forestal, particularmente en
cuanto regula los bosques nativos, y lo hace, además, con un criterio en
el que prima lo extractivo sobre lo ecológico afecta de manera clara y
directa a dichas comunidades.
Id.
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have knowledge over an activity (here, forest management) that is
rooted in a different set of values than those that predominate in
the extractive capitalist model.
Third, one cannot underestimate the value of linking national
law to a powerful, detailed international instrument that is widely
admired like ILO Convention 169. 83 Further on in the opinion, the
Court thus clearly makes reference to the utility of arguments
based upon ILO Convention 169, which demonstrate, the Court
observes:
a new understanding of the situation of indigenous and
tribal peoples in all regions of the world, such that it was
necessary to eliminate the tendency favoring assimilation to
which they had been led, and instead, in its place, to
establish a principle that would conform to the structures
and forms of life of indigenous and tribal peoples as
permanent and durable, and [that] the international
community would have interest in the intrinsic value of
these communities to be saved. 84
83 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–49 (2d.
ed. 2004) (recognizing that Convention No. 169 can be viewed as both “a
manifestation of the movement toward responsiveness to indigenous peoples’
demands through international law and . . . the tension inherent in that
movement” but concluding that the convention was ultimately successful “in
affirming the value of indigenous communities and cultures . . . .”). See generally
Russel Lawrence Barsh, An Advocate’s Guide to the Convention on Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 209 (1990) (discussing the rights advanced
by Convention No. 169 and urging advocates for indigenous rights to broadly
interpret and promote the convention’s provisions); Lee Swepston, A New Step in
the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of
1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 677 (1990) (considering the advances made by
Convention No. 169 in recognizing the existence and rights of indigenous peoples
and encouraging ratification). See also Jeremy Valeriote, Chile’s Supreme Court
Upholds Indigenous Water Use Rights, SANTIAGO TIMES, Nov. 30, 2009 (describing a
similar first application of the ILO Convention 169 by the Chilean Supreme Court
to protect tribal water rights in a conflict between Aymara tribes and a company
seeking to bottle and sell a freshwater source the tribe historically relied upon).
84 Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11.

[E]l Convenio 169 de la OIT fue adoptado con base en una nueva
aproximación a la situación de los pueblos indígenas y tribales en todas
las regiones del mundo, conforme a la cual era preciso eliminar la
orientación hacia la asimilación que se había venido manejando, para, en
su lugar, asentar el principio conforme al cual las estructuras y formas de
vida de los pueblos indígenas y tribales son permanentes y perdurables,
y la comunidad internacional tiene interés en que el valor intrínseco de
sus culturas sea salvaguardado.
Id. pt. VI, ¶ 4.2.
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Importantly, moreover, for the Court, this is not merely a
matter of compliance with international obligations. It thus
demonstrates its sympathy for the view that it is the obligation of
the State not only to secure the standard range of political and civil
rights characteristic of modern democracies, but also “freely to
articulate, with State support, for the promotion of their
associational interests that have as their object the formation of
democratic mechanisms of representation in different types of
participation . . . .” 85 Once again, what is striking from an
environmental justice perspective is the linkage—or perhaps,
better said, the juxtaposition—of three separate but related
concerns:
democratic participation, cultural inclusion, and
different methods of responding to and interacting with the
physical environment.
Fourth, Decision C-080 stands as an early, broad, and deep
endorsement of public participation for access to positive
environmental benefits poised to further the aims of environmental
protection and community resource access, particularly for
indigenous and Afro-descendent minority communities. With
respect specifically to “the measures that may be susceptible
directly to affect indigenous and tribal peoples,” the Court
affirmed that it “has said that this is a direct consequence of the
right of native communities to decide the priorities in their process
of development and cultural preservation” such that the public
consult is a legal means for the “defense of identity and cultural
integrity and its status as a participatory mechanism.” 86 One could
hardly wish for a clearer endorsement of a functional role for a
85 Id. ¶ 4.2.1 (“[D]e articularse libremente, con el apoyo del Estado, para la
promoción de sus intereses, en asociaciones que tengan por objeto constituir
mecanismos democráticos de representación en las diferentes instancias de
participación, concertación, control y vigilancia de la gestión pública que se
establezcan.”).
86 Id. ¶ 4.2.2.

En relación con el deber de consulta de las medidas que sean
susceptibles de afectar directamente a los pueblos indígenas y tribales, la
Corte ha dicho que el mismo es consecuencia directa del derecho que les
asiste a las comunidades nativas de decidir las prioridades en su proceso
de desarrollo y preservación de la cultura y que, cuando procede ese
deber de consulta, surge para las comunidades un derecho fundamental
susceptible de protección por la vía de la acción de tutela, en razón a la
importancia política del mismo, a su significación para la defensa de la
identidad e integridad cultural y a su condición de mecanismo de
participación.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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broad, pluralistic view of political participation in a multicultural
democracy.
In contrast, consider the form of public participation included
in the forestry law struck down by the Court’s decision, C-080. By
international standards, the Colombian forestry law’s participation
provisions were up-to-date. The law began with a commitment to
economically productive and sustainable forest management.87
Furthermore, the law went on to commit the nation to the
protection and development of rural communities 88 and to the
study and sharing of traditional knowledge as “fundamental
elements in the sustainable management of natural forests and the
development of tree plantations.” 89 Moreover, the law provided
the following assurance: “[t]he State guarantees the right of
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to make decisions
freely, within the framework of the Constitution and the law, with
respect to forestry activities of a sustainable character that they
wish to apply in their territories.” 90 The law also created a
National Forestry Council comprised of state and private actors
with forestry interests, as well as two representatives from each of
the indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, in addition to a
number of other seats for representatives of the non-profit
environmental
and
sustainable
development
activist
91
communities. Additionally, Article 19, in conformity with other
laws protecting minority rights, contained a specific requirement
for a prior consult, of at least 12 months in advance, with AfroColombian and indigenous communities with respect to the
“enjoyment, management, and use” of the forests. 92

87 See Ley 1021 de 2006, abril 24, 2006 Diario Oficial [D.O.] 45.249, art. 2(1),
(Colom.) (promising to prioritize the sustainable management of Colombia's
forests while maintaining that any actions taken will be in line with international
law).
88 See id. art. 2(6) (detailing how the sustainable management plans will
include a focus on maintaining and improving the living conditions for rural
communities).
89 Id. art. 2(7) (“[E]lementos fundamentales para el manejo sostenible de los
bosques naturales y el desarrollo de plantaciones forestales.”).
90 Id. art. 2(10) (“El Estado garantiza el derecho de las comunidades indígenas
y afrocolombianas a la libre toma de decisiones, dentro del marco de la
Constitución y la ley, respecto de las actividades forestales de carácter sostenible
que desearen emprender en sus territorios . . . .”).
91 Id. art. 7.
92 Id. art. 19 (reiterating the focus on the protection of indigenous and rural
communities in regards to the use or management of forests in their territories).
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If the goal of public hearings is to involve possibly affected
populations, the prior Colombian law was arguably much stronger
than many U.S. and European examples. In the U.S. context, there
exists an over-reliance on “technical and scientific tools and
norms” that fail to “recognize the complex social, political and
ethical concerns embedded in many environmental and natural
resource issues.” 93 This can result from adherence to a “tightly
structured and open public process” that nonetheless, “[i]n
practice . . . is frequently manipulated into announce-and-defend
decision-making, in which meaningful outside input [from the
potentially most-affected communities] is effectively stillborn.”94
In the European context, a possible preference in public
participation for larger and well-financed environmental interest
groups to the exclusion of smaller, community-based interest
groups likely leads, it has been observed, to the “dangers of
capture and exclusion.” 95
Thus, the Colombian Constitutional Court’s rejection of the
law’s relatively far-sighted public participation requirements is
striking.
Perhaps even more significantly, the complaint
demonstrated that neither the executive nor the legislative
branches of government had observed even the most minimal
public consultation before promulgating the forestry law, a serious
error because the law affected indigenous and minority
communities directly. 96 Paradoxically, the elitist promulgation of
the law, which ignored its basic requirements, resulted in a
decision that puts in place an even more robust prior consult
procedure that can be used to ensure an even more powerful voice
for indigenous and ethnic minority Colombians.
Fifth, Decision C-080’s significance extends to its consistent
intertwining of social, environmental, and natural resource
93
Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, in
JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 139,
141–42 (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002).
94 Id. at 143.
95 JANE HOLDER & MARIA LEE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, LAW AND POLICY:
TEXT AND MATERIALS 129 (2d ed. 2007).
96 See Complaint, supra note 36.

Se solicita a la honorable Corte Constitucional que se declare la
inexequibilidad de la totalidad de la Ley 1021 de 2006, por no haberse
realizado consulta previa a las comunidades indígenas ni a los pueblos
afrodescendientes durante el proceso de construcción de la iniciativa
legislativa que condujo a la expedición de la Ley 1021 de 2006.
Id. § 1.2.
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concerns. For the Colombian Constitutional Court, minority
interests are more than central to the protection of national
resource interests; they are indivisible from them. 97 The Court thus
explained: “[t]he content of the general forestry law demonstrates
an undeniable national interest, whose provisions affect, in a broad
way, all Colombians, and in a specific way, a group of diverse
sectors, who have a closer relation to forests and with forestry
activities or are dependent on them.” 98 Therefore, the law fails not
just because it directly and negatively affected the autonomy of
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, but also because its
application “could have repercussions over the forms of life in and
over the close relationships that are maintained in the forest.” 99
Unlike the majority of U.S. environmental cases, which proceed
from a premise in the negative of unequal environmental burdens,
Decision C-030 advances a positive, inclusive vision of the benefits
of applying environmental justice principles. For the Colombian
Constitutional Court in Decision C-080, protecting minority rights
acts to defend the rights of all.
Sixth, Decision C-030 provides a normative road map for the
benefits of advance and inclusive environmental planning. It
recognizes that short-term economic interests need to yield to longterm environmental consequences. For example, Decision C-030
suggests that a reformulated prior consult process would result in
decisions that reduce rates of forest extraction today and promote
other long-term goals that matter both for economic and
environmental sustainability (including water resource protection
and land stabilization to prevent erosion). 100 In addition, the
Decision understands biodiversity protection as bearing upon the
continued healthy development of human societies as well as being
a value in its own right. 101 As the Court acknowledged, this is not
a trivial matter in the Colombian case since the nation contains an

97 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3(a) (emphasizing that while the
Forestry Act is important to all Colombians, it is of particular importance to
industries and groups of people with close ties to the forest).
98 Id.
99 Id. ¶ 5.3(d).
100 See Rômulo S.R. Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: The Evolving
Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism Ten
Years After the Kyoto Protocol, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634, 675 (2008) (emphasizing
the possibility of negative long-term consequences such as increased erosion and
problems with water supply).
101 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, art. 4, ¶¶ 3, 8, 13 (focusing on
involving indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them).
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estimated 14% of the world’s biodiversity, the world’s second
highest number of species per land unit, and three times the
number of avian species as in all of North America. 102 Importantly,
the Court acknowledged that forest protection plays a role in
response to climate change, because forests are “carbon sinks.” 103
Seventh, Decision C-080 implicitly makes the case that
environmental, land use, and development policies need to be
linked. A failure to include affected communities in exploitation of
the forests where they have flourished will have consequences
including, most likely, immigration to larger urban centers for
work. Only by stemming urban migration can Colombia and other
Latin American countries begin to reduce poverty and urban
violence in cities ill-equipped to handle, and unable to
productively employ, all of the new arrivals. 104
3.

REFLECTIONS ON SECURING LAND USE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

As noted at the outset of this essay, environmental justice
claims most typically focus on preventing harm to communities in
the United States. 105 Decision C-080 charts a different path,
providing a more ample conception of environmental justice that
understands individuals and communities as existing on land and
within the environment with a central role to play in their
protection. In this way, Decision C-080 adopts the dominant U.S.
view and demonstrates the extreme artificiality of the conception
of environmental matters as federal, and land use questions as
local.
102 Country Profiles Page—Colombia, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=co (last visited Mar. 3, 2010)
(summarizing the components of biodiversity in Columbia’s ecological system).
103 Sampaio, supra note 100, at 638 (detailing how forests can store large
amounts of carbon, but become problematic when disturbed because this leads to
forests releasing the carbon instead of retaining it).
See generally U.N.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT: LAND USE,
LAND USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2000), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/spm/srl-en.pdf (discussing the carbon
cycle and how different forestry and land use practices affect standing carbon
stocks and greenhouse emissions).
104 Hernán Darío Correa, Ordenamiento Territorial, participación social y manejo
de áreas protegidas en medio de la crisis humanitaria y el conflicto armado en Colombia, in
REGIÓN, CIUDAD Y ÁREAS PROTEGIDAS: MANEJO AMBIENTAL PARTICIPATIVO 51, 61–64
(Felipe Cárdenas Támara et al. eds., 2005).
105 See RECHSTAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 1, at 329 (describing a program that
provides data on every county in the United States and highlighting
environmental justice implications).
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In contrast to the view dominant in the United States, the
Colombian Constitutional Court’s Decision C-080 provides a biocentric vision of environmental protection that understands human
actors as one part of a more complex and dynamic system.
Assuring justice in access to environmental benefits—what has
been called here “positive” environmental justice—is thus a
mechanism that does not merely defend individual or group rights
for their own sake but also helps ensure the long-term
sustainability and survivability of all people and all things.
Decision C-080 does so with its repeated and emphatic linking of
social and environmental concerns. This is quite unlike, for
example, the refusal to recognize the way human beings interact
with and affect the environment in a noted decision like the 2006
Rapanos case. In that case, writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia
advanced a view of the hydrological cycle’s functioning that no
scientist would likely support. 106 By contrast, the Decision C-080’s
nuanced and layered attention to human-environmental reactions
and the consequences of thoughtless environmental and land use
management is encouraging not only for its defense of minority
community rights but also because, as has been suggested above,
the Decision understands that minority rights deserve protection
because in so doing one defends larger goals of social and
environmental stability.

106 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–34 (2006) (tying the Clean
Water Act’s grant of jurisdiction to a dictionary definition of streams, rivers,
oceans, and lakes, despite scientific evidence of the extensive interconnection over
land and underground among water bodies).
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